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ABSTRACT 
This paper will present a strategic reading of Habermas's project since the publishing of 
his "Legitimation Crisis." We examine his consensus theory of truth, the assumption of 
mutually acceptable outcomes in political discourse, and the role of law in bringing about 
social solidarity. We argue that Habermas has made several questionable assumptions 
while constructing this project that leave him open to criticism. We suggest that in his 
desire to preserve the Enlightenment, Habermas has ignored the power dimension of 
political life, leading him in a very "uncritical" direction. 
 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Introduction 
 In his recent work, Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas denounces 
sociology for being overly critical and perpetrating a "disillusioning, if not downright 
cynical, view of the political process."(Habermas 1996, 329.)  Such a condemnation 
appears curious, as Habermas has emerged from one of the more critical traditions within 
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the discipline of sociology.  However, for the last twenty years Habermas has been 
moving away from the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars.   
 After the publication of the Legitimation Crisis Habermas claims to have 
undergone a change in his thinking.  As Habermas describes it, he used to think the 
problems of late capitalism were steering problems.  Since that time, however, Habermas 
has come to the position that the problems of contemporary industrial society are 
normative in nature.(Habermas 1996, 333.) 
 Habermas makes it clear in numerous places that he views society as having lost 
its normative path.  One of the best examples of this view can be found at the end of "The 
Unity of Reason in the Diversity of its Voices."  Here, Habermas speaks of how 
normative discourse has given way to "contextualism."  The problem, as Habermas 
describes it, is that contextualism takes what has traditionally remained at the margin of 
discourse and brought it to the center.(Habermas 1992, 140.)  Even when reading a 
fictional detective story he claims to have been struck by the normative chaos of 
contextualism.  The place of perpetrator and victim have been confused.(Habermas 1992, 
140.)   
 Given his epistemological assumption that no metaphysical support can be 
provided for a universal ethical system, Habermas must confront a problem.  If the 
contemporary crisis is normative, what kind of ethical system can be developed that  
satisfies the requirements for universality while also providing a mechanism for 
validation within a non-ontological and non-metaphysical framework?   
 Habermas seeks a universal ethical foundation.  He bemoans the fact that 
universalism has come to be treated as an enemy of the individual just as the "unity of 
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reason" has come to be painted as a form of repression.(Habermas 1992, 140.)  Habermas 
claims that even a diverse, decentered society needs some reference point.  This is 
provided by a projected unity, as presented in the idea of a common will.(Habermas 1992, 
141.) 
 Habermas has attempted to strengthen the normative component of modernism 
with his discourse ethic.  This strategy is designed to "deontologize" traditional modernist 
defenses of democratic practice rooted in metaphysics and the "philosophy of 
consciousness."  Habermas seeks to accomplish this goal by externalizing the foundations 
of normativity, placing them within the structure of discourse itself.  This normative turn 
forces Habermas back in the direction of Kant.  In order to validate his commitment to 
Enlightenment values such as democracy, equality, humanism, and progress, Habermas 
has had to reject all skeptical and relativistic theories of knowledge and ethics.   As a 
result of this position Habermas has rejected the epistemological relativism of the 
postmoderns, an epistemological paradigm that asserts all claims to social truth are 
reflective of historical conditions and power relations.  Further, he has denounced the late 
modern subjectivism presented by Weber, in which Weber claims that all meaning in the 
world reflects subjective opinion. (Habermas 1984, 14.)  Even the critique of instrumental 
reason offered by Horkheimer and Adorno, as the means-ends calculation associated with 
the promotion of capitalism, is insufficient for his defense of modernity.  For that 
Habermas requires a formalized ethic of communication. (Habermas 1984, 383-386.) 
 This work will present a strategic reading of Habermas's project since the 
Legitimation Crisis.  Critical works on Habermas abound. (Fleming 1996, Foster 1999, 
Whitton 1992, Horowitz 1998, Kaufman 1999)  The goal of this essay is the 
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representation of Habermas’s writings as a series of problems to be solved.  Through this 
type of reading it will be argued that Habermas's project fails on several fronts.  First, 
there are real difficulties with the conception of truth that Habermas establishes in order 
to operationalize his discourse ethics.  Secondly, Habermas has deontologized the subject 
by substituting an uncritical teleology which contains the premises of modernity.  This 
modernist teleology stands in for the lost construct of subjectivity in his deontologized 
philosophy.  In the end, therefore, Habermas is unsuccessful in his attempt to move 
beyond the choice between Hegel and Kant.  This problem manifests itself politically, as 
Habermas can describe a democratic process but cannot offer a non-metaphysical 
explanation of why it should be defended. 
 Finally, this paper will claim that the movement toward language philosophy in 
Habermas’s work has narrowed, if not eliminated, the liberating potential of discourse.  
The liberating possibilities within Freud have given way to the syntactical structures of 
language.  Habermas has abandoned the critique of instrumentalism started by Weber and 
Lukacs and carried on by Adorno and Horkheimer.  In its place, is an uncritical stand 
toward modernity, undercutting the work of the first generation of Frankfurt School 
scholars.  Rather than offering a means to resist the instrumentalization of the lifeworld, 
Habermas actually extends it by instrumentalizing discourse itself.  This is reflected in his 
latest work, where we get a defense of stabilizing possibilities of democratic practice 
rather than an expression of its liberating potential.   
 
I. Philosophy, Truth, and Reason 
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 Habermas proceeds from the premise that consensus on normative questions can 
be found.  This can occur only when discourse takes place within a pragmatically justified 
set of rules for argumentation.  His task is to legitimate such a project.   
 The problems to be addressed can be broken up into three sub-projects that give 
rise to Habermas's three major concerns of the last ten years.  The first problem involves 
creating a method for validating truth that is not grounded in metaphysical assumptions. 
(Postmetaphysical Thinking).  Next, a foundation for the establishment of a universalist 
ethic must be constructed that does not emerge from metaphysics (Moral Consciousness 
and Communicative Action).  And finally, Habermas moves into the discussion of the 
implications of this for politics, the law, and legislation in his latest work. (Between Facts 
and Norms)  During this time Habermas has had to confront his critics, particularly the 
structuralists and the poststructuralists, and contextualize his own transformation (The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and Justification and Application).   
 This schemetization might appear a bit too simplistic, and it is.  Clearly the works 
overlap and reinforce one another.  However, an understanding of how the works fit 
together helps to clarify the role each work plays in an overall project. 
 
A. The Problem of Metaphysics 
 The problems that Habermas needs to confront with his attempt to move beyond 
metaphysics cannot be separated from his overall defense of the Enlightenment project.  
In the British Empiricist tradition the project of validating truth claims had been 
intertwined with the project of defining the parameters of subjective experience.  This 
took the form of a connection between sense impressions and the emergence of the idea 
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in the individual.(Locke, 1961 and Hume, 1962.)  The problem with this strategy of 
validation is that projecting from individual subjective experience to a universal condition 
requires a metaphysical jump.  As Hume recognized, one must always remain skeptical of 
such an imposition by the mind. 
 A different metaphysical problem emerges within Kant's modernism.  For Kant, 
two metaphysical assumptions initiate the project.  The first is the universal character of 
reason, which is attributed to human nature as a whole.  The second assumption concerns 
the underpinning of all morality, the assumption of freedom of the will.  Even while 
admitting he cannot prove the latter, Kant will state emphatically that the autonomy of the 
will is the supreme principle of morality.(Kant 1971, 187.)  Linked to the assumption of 
freedom, the categorical imperative is a logical deduction based on the universalization of 
the premises.  As Kant admitted, what emerges is a metaphysical doctrine, based on the 
premise of human free will.(Kant 1965, 13-16.)   
 Habermas's challenge is to produce a non-metaphysical form of validation that is 
not embedded in the philosophy of the consciousness.  Such a form of validation must be 
able to serve as a foundation for universality, and thus provide support for humanism, 
democratic political practice, and a plurality of forms of living within the lifeworld. To 
this end, Habermas accepts the universality of reason, albeit in a reformulated fashion.  
Habermas also reformulates the categorical imperative.  In the postmetaphysical 
framework, it is a set of conditions necessary for normative validity without the 
assumption of free will embedded in a philosophy of consciousness.(Habermas 1990, 78.) 
 The problem of producing a non-metaphysical form of validation is solved using 
the structure of communication.  The validating mechanism for truth claims is then 
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outside both ontological assumptions about human nature and subjective modes of 
validation.  Communication through language assumes that there is a common objective 
world that all of the participants are discussing.(Habermas 1992, 138.)  It further assumes 
that the goal of communication is the mutual understanding of the participants.(Habermas 
1996, 3.)  In contrast to the poststructuralist's view of meaning, Habermas claims that 
such communicative activity also assumes stability in the meaning of the concepts used in 
communicative action.(Habermas 1996, 11.)  Habermas cites the similarity between 
Western and Chinese culture on the normative character of "philosophic necessity" as a 
demonstration that moral questions can be translated across cultures and are thus 
universalizable.(Habermas 1990, 39.) 
 Assuming all of these conditions Habermas is ready to make the next claim.  The 
"ideal" by which society, political institutions, and cultural norms can be measured 
resides within the system of language as those conditions that enhance the ideal of non-
coercive discourse with the intended outcome of mutual understanding.  Using Kantian 
language to explain his point, Habermas asserts that the theory of communicative action 
detranscendentalizes the noumenal, placing its ideal context-transcending logic within the 
pragmatic presuppositions of speech acts.(Habermas 1996, 19.)  Both speaker and listener 
assume the ideal of mutual understanding as a condition for engaging in communication 
and this goal carries the weight as a quasi-transcendental normative ideal.   Put another 
way, an analysis of the conditions necessary for mutual understanding allows for the idea 
of intersubjectivity, making compulsion-free understanding possible.(Habermas 1992, 
145.)   
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B. Normative Validity 
 Having located the ideal of speech within the objective conditions of 
communication Habermas must now confront another question.  Assuming that the 
conditions for engaging in discourse exist, what criteria are to be used for judgment in the 
actual conduct of normative discourse?  Habermas repeats several times that his model of 
discourse is not designed to confront the specific content of normative discourse but to 
outline its conditions.(Habermas 1992, 145-146.)  However, Habermas is also aware that 
to pose a normative structure such as his requires some means of validation.  Here 
Habermas asserts a particular set of assumptions, that while necessary to the achievement 
of his objective, appear particularly problematic.  
 Habermas rejects both the late modernism of Weber and the postmodernism of 
Foucault and Derrida.  Weber locates the validity for normative statements within the 
personal commitments of individual personalities.  With a plurality of subjects and 
possible attitudes toward the world, Weber concluded that normative discourse takes on 
the character of a war among competing "gods."(Weber in Gerth and Mills, 1946, 152-
153.)  Foucault and Derrida argue that the origins of normative claims are to be found 
within the content of culture and history.  Lacking any transcendental foundation, 
normative claims have an arbitrary character and acquire the potential for repression 
when transformed into institutional practice. 
 Habermas is forced to confront this critique of modernist universality with a 
response.  He does so with what William Outhwaite calls a "consensus theory of 
truth."(Outhwaite 1994, 41.)  Habermas asserts that normative declarations are assertions 
of propositional truth claims.  All propositions that claim status as truth must be 
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proven.(Habermas 1996, 14.)  Therefore, claims to normative validity also require 
demonstration.  Normative claims have cognitive meaning and can be treated like other 
claims to truth.(Habermas 1990, 68.) 
 To survive the test of validity several requirements must be met.  The proposition 
must be constructed on assumptions that remain unchallenged as part of the environment 
in the lifeworld.  The lifeworld constitutes the background condition for communicative 
acts.(Habermas 1996,14, 21-22.)  Validity, however, comes from consensus.  The truth 
claim must be able to gain the rationally motivated agreement of the entire 
community.(Habermas 1996, 14.)  This requires any normative proposition to "transcend 
time and space."(Habermas 1992, 139.)  It must conform to the principle of 
universalization.  A normative proposition satisfies the conditions of universality if all 
affected can accept the consequences of it for the satisfaction of everyone's 
interest.(Habermas 1990, 65.)  Thus, a normative proposition is "true" if those affected by 
it can agree that it is true. 
 
C. Weakness of Postmetaphysical Validation 
 Before moving into the specifics of Habermas's discourse ethics some reflections 
on truth, validity, and normative universality are in order.  For better or worse, Habermas 
has clearly parted company with the first generation of the Frankfurt School.  Instead of 
offering a critique of instrumental reason, Habermas has universalized the content of 
reason and reasserted the modernism of Kant over the skepticism of Weber and Lukacs.   
 Habermas is not content with the Weberian formulation of the ideal type as a 
subjective model for comparative purposes.  Habermas is seeking to ground a non-
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subjective universal truth that can be used for both steering purposes and as a foundation 
for the generation of solidarity.  By locating the normative ideal outside of the subject, 
Habermas claims to have rewritten the Kantian categorical imperative with deontologized 
foundation.  
 Does it work?  The answer depends on what assumptions one is willing to 
concede.  To return to Kant's project in a postmetaphysical world Habermas has had to 
make one addition to the Kantian assumptions of equality and freedom.  This is contained 
in the consensus theory of truth.  “Agreement” takes the place of the transcendental 
content assumed in the Kantian formulation.  If one is willing to add this assumption, 
then Habermas may be palatable thus far.  However, a problem still remains.  By 
conjoining normative and empirical claims under the umbrella of cognitive theory 
Habermas may have created a problem for the consensus theory of truth.  It could be 
argued that in the normative realm, Habermas has confused political legitimacy with 
propositional truth.   
 If, however, one is less certain about accepting Habermas's assumptions two 
alternative criticisms are possible.  From a traditional normative perspective that is not 
"deontologized" Habermas has thrown out the baby with the bath water.  In removing the 
thinking feeling subject from the discourse over context, a context that has now been 
externalized and objectified, Habermas may be extending the dehumanization of the 
lifeworld he professes to be against.  Habermas may be furthering the project of 
rationalization looked upon so suspiciously by the very founders of Critical Theory.  How 
can a particular form of political activity be defended if it is not assumed to reinforce a 
particular construction of the self? 
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 Looked at from another perspective Habermas's construction may be even more 
problematic.  One of the central assumptions of Habermas is the idea that the identity of 
concepts and objects that constitute the material elements of discourse remain stable.  
This is an assumption that not everyone accepts, particularly within a "contextualized" 
social science.  One need not go as far as Derrida and Foucault to raise a question on this 
point.  Once, however, the content of symbolic language becomes tainted by historical 
analogy the concept of a quasi-transcendent universal is in doubt.   
 
II. Ethical Proceduralism 
 Habermas believes that his articulation of a means for validating normative claims 
allows for the development of an ethical system that avoids the metaphysical problems 
associated with early modernism.  The consensus theory of truth plays a critical role in 
returning to the Enlightenment ethic.  After incorporating elements of various authors, 
Habermas returns to Kant for a reformulation of the categorical imperative, now stripped 
of its metaphysical overtones.  A procedure for deriving ethical claims has been created 
that meets the test of validity and no longer relies on the philosophy of the subject or 
metaphysical presuppositions for its support.  At least, that is Habermas's intent. 
 
A. The Formal Conditions of Normative Discourse 
 Habermas's goal is to describe a set of conditions that must be present in order for 
normative discourse to have validity.  These conditions, then, represent the standards by 
which the conditions of moral discourse are established.  Like Kant, Habermas is 
interested in the form and conditions of normative discourse.  Habermas states directly 
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that he is not interested in developing a specific content to his moral 
formulation.(Habermas 1992, 145-146.)  Adherence to a "procedure" for the creation of 
ethical norms assumes the validating role rather than the actual content. 
 Habermas's "discourse ethics" emerges from several basic assumptions that build 
on the claims contained in his work on postmetaphysical philosophy.  As Habermas puts 
it, discourse ethics stand or fall on two assumptions: that normative claims to validity 
have cognitive meaning and can be treated like truth claims and that the justification of 
norms requires real discourse.(Habermas 1990, 68.)  Or as Habermas puts it in 
Justification and Application, "[a]nyone who seriously engages in argumentation must 
presuppose... the pragmatic assumption that they allow their "yes" and "no" responses to 
be influenced solely by the force of the better argument."(Habermas 1993, 31.)   
 But Habermas really requires more.  To these claims several additional 
assumptions must be noted.  First, Habermas assumes that an ideal speech situation is 
empirically rational, even while denying it presently exits.  It cannot be just a 
"hypothetical, mental exercise"(Habermas 1990, 68.) otherwise it would not carry the 
cognitive validity that Habermas requires.  Second, in contrast to the "warring gods" 
position of Max Weber and all subjectivist notions of values, Habermas assumes that it is 
possible to produce an outcome from discourse that is acceptable to all sides.  Thus the 
"principle of universalization" is the foundational premise for the "principle of discourse 
ethics."(Habermas 1990, 65.)  Finally, not only does Habermas assert that the principle of 
discourse ethics can be used to solve disputes, but that the outcome of this process 
constitutes the measure of normative validity.  The circular dynamic is now complete.   
 13 
 Habermas admits that this claim has a transcendental character, albeit a weak 
one.(Habermas 1990, 31.)  The principle of discourse ethics states, "[o]nly those norms 
can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse."(Habermas 1990, 66.)  Ignoring for the 
moment the problems presented by "or could meet," Habermas asserts that normative 
validity stems not from a connection to a transcendental form of universal morality, but 
that it emerges from the conditions that allow for real discourse among human beings 
engaged in the rational conduct of life.  The claim is repeated in Between Facts and 
Norms, where Habermas states that a truth claim is valid if it can gain the rationally 
motivated agreement of the entire community.(Habermas 1996, 14.)  Thus we have the 
condition where valid normative claims stem from human interaction, but transcend "us" 
and any local here and now.(Habermas 1996, 14.)  Anticipating a challenge on this claim 
Habermas claims that the method engaged for this demonstration is comparable to 
"induction."(Habermas 1990, 77.)   
 Habermas's claim here is not just "comparable" to induction, it is induction.  This 
is clearly demonstrated in Habermas's discussion of the emerging content in ethical 
systems.  The content for ethical discourse has its origins in the composition of culture, 
tradition, and the "lifeworld."  Discourse ethics is only formal.  It is a procedure for 
testing the validity of norms, not a specific assertion of content.(Habermas 1990, 103.)  
Practical discourse relies on content from the outside, where actors feel the need to 
regulate some issue.(Habermas 1990, 103.)   
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B. Problems with Discourse Ethics 
 What Habermas hopes to gain is the return to a politics, lost since 
Aristotle,(Habermas 1996, 1.) that engages practical discourse and avoids a "power 
centered" politics outlined by the disillusioning voices of sociology.  However, Habermas 
rejects science and behaviorism as a source of universalizable normative 
prescriptions.(Habermas 1990, 39.)  This leaves him with a dilemma.  Habermas wants 
universal norms to emerge from a discursive process.  However, the content of these 
norms have their origins in conditions that are local and specific.  Habermas gets around 
this by asserting only the conditions of discourse constitute the universal. 
 From the point of view of one who is even mildly skeptical, discourse ethics 
appears in the following form: as a procedure that legitimates the conversion of 
inductively drawn generalizations to the status of universals.  It does not negate the power 
of majoritarian discourse, it masks it under the umbrella of universalized ethical 
procedure.  Habermas tries to avoid this with the claim that universal validity can be 
ascribed only in those instances where the will of all approves or could approve the 
normative claim.  Here the universalization of reason comes into play and its repressive 
political potential is revealed.  The danger of being considered "irrational" negates 
legitimate opposition to majoritarian proclamations.  A majoritarian agenda emerges as 
the source of content, as Habermas admits that every society needs the unity of a common 
will.(Habermas 1992, 141.)  In this way the community can restore the consensus that 
Habermas assumes is the natural condition of humanity.(Habermas 1990, 67.) 
 Problems with Habermas’s position are revealed in his anticipation of challenges 
posed by ethical subjectivism.  From that position, exemplified by Weber, value claims 
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cannot be validated by external objective criteria.  Values constitute internal normative 
preference on the part of individuals and, as such, are conditioned by history and shaped 
by the influence of competing values.  It is part of the human condition that these values 
cannot be reconciled, but exist in a state of constant struggle.  Consensus is only a 
temporary truce in the struggle of ideals. 
 To confront this view Habermas makes two assumptions.  The first is that 
consensus on values can be reached on many matters through a discursive strategy, thus 
supplanting struggle with "reason."  Secondly, the matters that cannot be reconciled 
through rational discourse should be removed from the arena of debate.(Habermas 1990, 
103.)  Here Habermas has either made his discourse ethics bland and impractical or 
utopian and useless to our present circumstance. 
 In the end, the discourse ethics that Habermas proposes is both illusory and 
contradictory.  What has really been solved?  In matters of real dispute, the inability to 
provide content appears as a severe weakness.  In this regard, Habermas's reformulation 
of the Kantian categorical imperative(Habermas 1990, 67.) does not solve the problem of 
content also found in Kant.  Substituting the consensus view of truth for Kant's 
transcendental reason only further politicizes philosophic inquiry, substituting a 
majoritarian notion of political legitimacy for philosophic validity. 
 There is also something familiar about the mechanism by which Habermas 
suggests we validate norms.  If we are using "something like" induction to reach the 
universal normative claims and, as Habermas concedes, the world is a totality of 
facts(Habermas 1996, 14.) that might require us to revisit normative claims when 
confronted with new information(Habermas 1990, 86.), is it not contradictory to suggest 
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that anything universal has come out of this process at all?  To assert the historical nature 
of the content is to strip discourse ethics of any practical character for settling disputes.  
Certainly the prescriptive outcomes cannot claim universal validity.  Even the universal 
character of the proceduralist ethic is suspect.  In the final analysis, Habermas's discourse 
ethic reinforces the mode of existence to which Habermas has already committed.  It does 
not "prove" the universal character of ethics.   
 Anticipating a challenge to his discourse ethics, Habermas employs an argument 
from Karl-Otto Apel.  Apel claims that any challenge to the presuppositions of the 
universal principles of argumentation actually engages those principles in the process of 
negation.  In this way one can be skeptical of the skeptic’s claims.  However, the skeptic 
can respond to such a claim by arguing that the assertion  "no universal validity can be 
established to any normative claim" takes the form of a metatheoretical proposition that 
denies the possibility of engaging in "rational, universal, ethical" discourse.  To the 
skeptic, rational universal discourse in the area of ethics manifests the same internal 
contradiction as the discussion of a square circle. 
 
III.  Political Discourse and the Law 
 The political agenda that underlies Habermas's project can be simply stated.  With 
the coming of the postmetaphysical age, the foundation for democratic practice and the 
protection of political rights has disintegrated.(Habermas 1995, 14.)  This disintegration 
has been enhanced by systems theory and empiricism, two approaches that have 
effectively eliminated the normative consideration of social solidarity. 
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 To Habermas, the law has a particularly important role to play in the 
reconstitution of the social solidarity.   Only a conception of law that maintains its 
integrating function can overcome the disintegrating effects of a disillusioning sociology.   
When natural law lost its universal character in the Nineteenth Century, the Aristotelian 
notion of a societal ethos gave way to a subjectivist interpretation of the 
normative.(Habermas 1996, 96)  When the sacred character of culture dissipated, the 
legal system was left to perform the integrating function.(Habermas 1996, 98-99.)  Only 
discourse ethics applied to the consideration of law can end the increasing separation 
between political theory and legal theory.(Habermas 1996, 6.)   
 
A. The Reconstruction of the Universal as a Means to Salvage Solidarity 
 Habermas's statement in the introduction to Between Facts and Norms should be 
take quite literally.  The resource that he sees endangered within the current conception of 
the legal order is social solidarity.(Habermas 1996, xlii.)  If this is the case, then the 
objective of Habermas's political project comes into focus.  He seeks to create a new 
foundation for a universalized conception of legal order that retains both the 
postmetaphysical epistemology and a defense of democratic practice.  The task is 
complicated by the fact, as Habermas admits, that the world is increasingly plural and 
complex.(Habermas 1996, 25.)   
 Habermas admits that increasing social complexity can bring about a decline in 
shared lifeworld assumptions, generating political instability.(Habermas 1996, 25.)  But 
Habermas has already set the stage for dealing with this problem in Postmetaphysical 
Thinking and Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.  The discursive goal of 
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"mutual understanding" suggested in Postmetaphysical Thinking gives way to the 
political goal of achieving consensus.  This displacement allows for the implementation 
of communicative reason, an external prerequisite for validity within the political 
realm.(Habermas 1996, 3-5.)  The assertion of universal reason, coupled with the idea 
that consensus is the measure of normative validity, allows for the reconstruction of 
political legitimacy within a framework of participatory democracy.  This situation, 
claims Habermas, can recapture the ideal of solidarity and not succumb to the danger of 
repression suggested by systems theory and poststructuralism.(Habermas 1992, 140.) 
 Solidarity reemerges within Habermas's scheme not from the creation of a 
common universalized content of morality, but through the recognition of a common set 
of procedures for normative discourse.  In communicative action, the speaker and hearer 
attempt to negotiate and harmonize their respective plans through mutual 
understanding.(Habermas 1996, 18.)  Every action coordinated without violence 
represents a demonstration of the activity of mutual understanding.(Habermas 1996, 17.) 
 The discursive process joins reason and will together, as language oriented to 
mutual understanding.  The outcome of this process should lead to a position to which all 
can agree.(Habermas 1996, 103.)  The norms that are represented in the outcomes of this 
practice are only valid if a such an agreement can be found.(Habermas 1996, 107.) 
 What happens where there are disagreements?  Here Habermas may have 
established an unrealistic response to this very real question.  The standard for normative 
validity is that everyone effected must, in principle, be able to agree to the proposed 
norm.  Admitting that there is a possibility for disagreement over normative claims 
Habermas suggests three choices among outcomes; repairing the consensus, ignoring the 
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area of disagreement, or withdrawing from public discourse.(Habermas 1996, 21.)  Since 
withdrawal is associated with the irrationalism, madness, or isolation he attributes to the 
postmodern attitude,(Habermas 1992, 145.) Habermas is left with only two possibilities.   
 To Habermas, consensus is difficult given the fact that the plurality of modern 
culture has eroded the background consensus in the lifeworld.(Habermas 1996, 25.)  
Since the conditions for consensus are found in the content of traditions and socialized 
identities within the lifeworld(Habermas 1996, 80.) this would seem to present an 
insurmountable obstacle.   
 But Habermas is not willing accept this conclusion, one that he associates with 
systems theory.(Habermas 1996, 330-341.)  In its place he offers two responses, one ideal 
and the other practical.  The ideal response is contained in the discussion of the teleology 
of communication.  Habermas assumes that communication occurs in order to reach 
understanding.  Understanding is a goal within normative discussions as well.  Ideally, 
when a disagreement occurs each side must learn from the other, bringing about a 
convergence of ideas, not a subservience of one idea to the other.(Habermas 1992, 138.)  
Habermas gives an indication of how this is achieved in Between Facts and Norms, 
suggesting that if there is an ethical disagreement neutral dialogue requires transition of 
the discourse to a higher level of abstraction where participants examine what lies in the 
equal interests of all.(Habermas 1996, 311.)  Ideally, in the discursive process reason and 
will are brought together as language oriented to mutual understanding that can lead to a 
position that all can accept without coercion.(Habermas 1996, 103.) 
 The practical side of this formula is the art of political bargaining through the 
legislative process.(Habermas 1996, 287.)  Consensus is not something that is found, but 
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something that is built through public discourse.  Majorities emerge through persuasion.  
Legitimate consensus can emerge, therefore, where the conditions for communicative 
reason are present.  Here the law plays a critical role in securing the conditions for 
communicative reason and protecting the space for true political discourse. 
 
B. Democracy, the Law, and the Administration of Power 
 One of the problems Habermas identifies with systems theory is that it presents a 
view of social life as a set of independent subsystems that are incapable of cross-system 
communication.(Habermas 1996, 335-341.)  To put this in the language of systems 
theory, there is no meta-language that can cut across the subsystems as each contains its 
own grammar and its own mechanism for validating truth claims.  Having demonstrated 
to his own satisfaction that this is not the condition of social life, Habermas rejects the 
political implications of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory as well as the political claims 
of the postmoderns.. 
 Habermas wants to return to the Aristotelian notion of politics as the master 
science.  The political system is one among many subsystems, but it has a unique role to 
play.  The "political" has the specific function of communicating with the other 
subsystems.(Habermas 1996, 302.)  Thus, the integration function of politics takes on a 
more general role.  It is not the individual alone that is the subject of the integrating 
effects of political discourse, but the other functional subsystems as well.  This 
integrating function is carried out by the law.(Habermas 1996, 17.) 
 The integrating function of the law, which means it cannot be separated from the 
source of its legitimacy in the lifeworld, necessitates a connection between the legitimacy 
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of legal codes and democratic practice.(Habermas 1996, 295.)  Only democratic 
procedures can legitimate the law.(Habermas 1995, 16.)  The law is bound to the 
lifeworld through ordinary language below the system of legal codes.(Habermas 1996, 
55.)  It is the law that constitutes the transforming mechanism between the normative 
foundations represented in the lifeworld and the system of administrative 
power.(Habermas 1996, 81.)  To claim legitimacy, therefore, the law must represent the 
general will and this can only occur through open democratic discourse.   
 Thus, Habermas claims that human rights are secured as part of the conditions 
necessary for the public use of communicative freedom.(Habermas 1995, 16.)  Public 
autonomy and private autonomy presuppose each other.(Habermas 1995, 17.)  As 
Habermas puts it, human rights and popular sovereignty still constitute the sole ideas that 
can justify modern law in the absence of metaphysics.(Habermas 1996, 99.) 
 Grounding morality outside of metaphysics allows Habermas to return to a 
reconstructed version of the Kantian formulation, suggesting that legal and moral rules, 
while different, should complement one another.(Habermas 1996, 105.)  In place of the 
philosophy of the subject Habermas has grounded the foundational support for his moral 
and political order in the conditions of communication.  As Habermas puts it, "[t]he `self' 
of the self-organizing legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of 
communications that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and will-formation in such a 
way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption of being reasonable."(Habermas 
1996, 301.)  To put it simply, the outcome of the discursive practice is considered to be 
legitimate because the form of discourse followed a notion of popular sovereignty located 
in the conditions for discourse itself.  Thus, even while Habermas is mildly critical of 
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Robert Dahl, he finds Dahl's proceduralist notion of democracy an important addition to 
democratic theory.(Habermas 1996, 315-318.) 
 Democratic procedures also legitimate the coercive function of law.  Legitimate 
coercion must be linked to the self-legislation of citizens.(Habermas 1996, 33.)  The law 
cannot be arbitrary without severing its link to the lifeworld and losing its integrating 
function.(Habermas 1996, 38.)  The less that the conditions for open discourse are found 
the more force will be required by the administrative system of power to maintain 
order.(Habermas 1996, 30.) 
 Therefore, Habermas claims that the level of open discourse is the measure of 
democracy in a society.(Habermas 1996, 303.)  The constitutional state and the welfare 
state can both be constructed without democracy.(Habermas 1996, 78.)  The construction 
of a true constitutional order (Rechtsstaat) is designed to protect the conditions of open 
discourse.  Disruptions to open discourse, Habermas claims, can come from the economic 
and administrative subsystems.(Habermas 1996, 56.)   
 The law lost its connection to normativity when the idea of natural law gave way 
to economic law.(Habermas 1996, 45.)  This allowed the penetration of values other than 
solidarity into the political discourse.  Today administrative power has become 
increasingly independent, short circuiting democratic procedures and legitimating its legal 
codes simply by enacting them.(Habermas 1996, 329.)  Our current political crisis is 
deepened by the unequal distribution of economic power that has diminished the potential 
to make effective use of the equal distribution of legal power.(Habermas 1995, 18.)  
Habermas concludes that the normative character of the law can only be secured with a 
more just distribution of socially produced wealth.(Habermas 1995, 18.) 
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 Our current social, political, and moral problems can only be overcome through a 
return to a form of politics that embraces the normative character of political discourse 
and returns the state to the apex of political life.(Habermas 1992, 140.)  Solidarity must 
be able to hold its own against the influences of money and power.(Habermas 1996, 299.)  
An open field for communication must be maintained if the acts of collective will 
formation are to be considered legitimate.  The modernist ideal of unity, human rights, 
and democratic practice represent sound, normatively defensible ideals that have yet to be 
realized. 
 
C. Teleological Ethics and Political Practice 
 With the publication of Between Facts and Norms Habermas has closed the circle.  
A non-metaphysical defense of democracy and the legal order has been constructed based 
on the premises of the discourse ethics.  To Habermas this achievement represents a 
return to the Kantian ethical system which has now been stripped of an ontology of the 
subject.  
 But what has Habermas really done with the return to Kant?  Has Habermas really 
removed the subject from the consideration of ethics?   At least two challenges to 
Habermas can be made.  It was Max Weber's contention that procedures and content 
cannot be so neatly separated.  As Weber put it, every political system must be evaluated 
according to the type of person it promotes.(Weber 1949, 27.)  From the perspective of 
the poststructuralists, an ethical commitment implicitly defends a particular structure of 
the subject by making the realization of a particular normative pattern of life possible.  
Therefore, from either a Weberian or a poststructuralist perspective, Habermas has not 
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proven the universality of reason and subjectivity, he has assumed them in order to 
operationalize his project.  Only then does the rest of the argument logically follow.   
 Even if one accepts Habermas's claim that he has removed subjectivity from the 
centerpiece of his system, the question of whether or not a metaphysical turn has be made 
remains open.  To put it simply, in attempting to remove the subject, Habermas has put 
increasing weight on a teleological conception of democracy's historical development as 
an indication of the validity of his discourse ethics.  Communicative action is a concept 
by which society can be analyzed, but it cannot maintain an objective status unless 
asserted as a teleological objective.  Despite Habermas's denial(Habermas 1992, 142.), 
one is either forced to return to a defense of the subject (Kant) or a philosophy of history 
(Hegel).  He has, therefore, not constructed a postmetaphysical defense of modernity, he 
has simply shifted the emphasis from ontology to teleology. 
 Even if we assume that he has succeeded in constructing a non-metaphysical 
defense of democratic practice, in the final analysis what would we have?  If Habermas 
has reconstructed the Kantian categorical imperative of what use is it?  In the 
Metaphysical Foundation of Morals, after Kant provides the reader with the justification 
for the categorical imperative, he then tries to apply it.  The results are so encumbered 
with additional assumptions, predisposed ethical norms and commitments, and possible 
alternative responses, such that the intent of the categorical imperative is rendered useless 
in application.(Kant 1977, 170-172.)  This conclusion was reached by John Stuart Mill in 
his writings on utilitarianism,(Mill 1963, 246.) and was one of Nietzsche's criticisms of 
Kant.(See Nietzsche 1973, 23. and Nietzsche 1989, 65.) 
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 The same criticism is valid for Habermas's reformulation.  Testing a universalist 
assumption by seeking consensus will either result in doctrines that are so vague that they 
are useless in the conduct of real decision making or generate paralysis in actual 
application.  The door is left open with the assertion that legitimacy stems from moral 
conclusion to which all could agree, but then the political struggle is likely to emerge 
around who sets the parameters as to the rational content of "could."  In the end, simple 
majoritarianism is likely to be the outcome when applied in practice.  From a classical 
liberal perspective, Habermas's neo-Aristotelian project would be particularly dangerous 
as discourse ethic erodes the barrier between the public and the private. 
 In the final analysis the application of discourse ethics also does not confront the 
distortions of communication brought about by wealth and power, but buries them under 
a utopian formulation.  Ethics based on universal consensus ignores the necessity of 
making decisions that do not offer the possibility of consensus.  It ignores the real 
fundamental differences in interests and commitments that make politics an arena of 
conflict as well as cooperation.  One does not have to adopt the late modernism of Weber 
or the postmodernism of Derrida and Foucault to understand that real differences about 
fundamental issues lie at the core of political life.  
 
Conclusion: The Politics of Stability 
 Read strategically, the defense of democracy and other Enlightenment ideals do 
not emerge as demonstrated "truths" from Habermas's analysis, but serve as premises for 
the exploration of political possibilities.  An observation of Kant made by Nietzsche can 
also be applied to Habermas.  In seeking to realize what he desired, Nietzsche claims 
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Kant found himself inventing the conditions that made it possible.(Nietzsche 1973, 23.)  
From this perspective, the fortification of modernity is a premise that underlies 
Habermas's project, out of which he develops the consensus theory of truth, discourse 
ethics, and the formal structure of democratic politics.   
 Returning to Kant, whether as postmetaphysics or neometaphysics, represents a 
fundamental break for critical theory (if one can even still call Habermas a "critical 
theorist" as at all).  Habermas has given up the idea that modernity itself may hold the 
seeds of human alienation and disintegration.  The critical edge of Weber and Freud as 
developed by Lukacs, Adorno, and Horkheimer has now disappeared.  The power of 
Weber's notion of instrumental reason at the core of the Frankfurt School has given way 
to the universalization of reason as the engine of modern democracy.  The liberating 
potential of Freudian psychoanalysis has been supplanted by the bland outline of 
democratic procedures found in Robert Dahl.   
 Habermas clearly does not want to raise any questions about the commitment to 
modernity.  However, this ignores the sources of estrangement and discord within 
modernity itself.  The problems presented by modernity are greater than the problems 
raised by capitalism and the administrative state.  The process of objectification is 
embedded within modernist epistemology, whether used within the economic or 
administrative systems.   
 Habermas's concern with democracy and solidarity are consistent with the agenda 
of both Marxism and critical theory.  But what kind of Marx is it?  There are no 
references to the objectifying character of the division of labor within modern industrial 
production.  To Habermas, the only problem in the modern political economy appears as 
 27 
the potential for “illegitimate” political influence asserted by wealth and power.  
Habermas has attached himself to modernity’s promises while refusing to recognize 
modernity's underlying conditions remain part of the problem. 
 By refusing to identify modernity with any of our contemporary problems 
Habermas has demonstrated a conservative turn in his thinking.  Consensus produces 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy maintains stability.  System stability, whether called "solidarity" 
or just simply "order," have taken priority over the idea of liberation.  The law has a 
particular role to play as it not only becomes an agent of social solidarity but also ..."can 
relieve the morally judging and acting person of the considerable cognitive, motivational, 
and organizational demands of a morality based entirely on individual 
conscience."(Habermas 1995, 15.)  This is not a liberating prospect. 
 Like Socrates in The Republic Habermas admits that no society will achieve his 
pure model of a communicative politics.(Habermas 1996, 326.)  The value of Habermas's 
project, then, can be seen in its role as a measure of the discursive space made available 
in political regimes.(Habermas 1996, 5.)  However, it may also be illustrative to take note 
of another statement by Socrates.  In Book Three of The Republic Socrates states that at 
times a lover of the state might need to construct a “fiction” in  defense of the social 
order, as a doctor uses medicine against a disease.(Plato 1955, 86.)  Can such a charge be 
brought against Habermas?  Could it be that out of a desire to overcome a perceived 
disease of disillusionment and disintegration in the West Habermas has constructed this 
model of ethical and political life?  Such a question is not easily answered.  However, the 
administration of any medicine first requires a correct diagnosis of the condition.  A lack 
of “order” does not seem to be Western societys’ problem at this point in history. 
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